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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order of the District Court
in and for Utah County, awarding Plaintiff/Respondent a money
judgment against Defendant/Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial Court, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding without a jury, found for the plaintiff/respondent in that
defendant/appellant was liable to the plaintiff/respondent in the
sum of $2,332076 on the basis of an open accounta
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
of the lower Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff/Respondent, City Electric, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff", initiated an action in the Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County,
seeking to recover a money judgment against Dean Evans Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., appellant/defendant, hereinafter referred to as
"defendant", for electrical materials (the "materials").
Plaintiff delivered the materials to a construction
remodeling site located in Provo, Utah.

Plaintiff has a store

in Orem, Utah, and at all times pertinent herein a Mr. Stewart
Donald Hatch was the local manager at Orem, Utah.
Between the periods of October and December, 1978, plaintiff delivered upon a construction remodeling site known as
"Johnny Rider's Backstage Restaurant"

(the "construction site"),

located at Provo, Utah, and/or sold certain electrical supplies
and materials to be used upon the construction site, from plaintiff's own Orem store.
Plaintiff in selling and/or delivering the materials
treated the same as an open account and charged the value of the
same to a credit account of the corporate defendant.
The corporate defendant, at all times pertinent herein,
was a duly authorized corporation and during the period of 1/12/78
to 3/12/79, M. D. Evans (Mike Evans) was an Assistant Secretary of
the corporate defendant (see Exhibit P-1, Annual Report of Organization).
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff, unilaterally, decided to treat the purchase
of the materials as an open account item and charged defendant's
own credit account at plaintiff's premises.
After the sale and delivery of the materials and when
payment was not received by plaintiff, plaintiff initiated this
action seeking to recover judgment against defendant.
Other than the maintenance of an account by defendant
at the plaintiff's place of business, there was no written or
oral agreement between plaintiff and defendant for the payment
of the materials upon which recovery is sought.
For purposes of correcting the record and clarity in
the Transcript of Trial (the "Transcript" or "Tr.") the word
"written" should be substituted for the word "recent" which presently appears on p. 16, line 6, and the words "written or oral"
should be substituted for the words "recent oral" as it presently
appears on p. 44, line 3e
The construction site upon which the materials were
used is not owned by nor is it connected with the business of
the defendant.
The materials sold by plaintiff did not go to the defendant corporation nor did defendant corporation benefit from
the merchandisee

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ACTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ORIGINAL PROMISE TO PAY
FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE ELECTRICAL GOODS BY PLAINTIFF, AND PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BY
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, §25-5-4(2)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

The basic issue presented in this case is whether or
not there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
finding of the trial Court that defendant's acts in dealing with
the plaintiff constituted an original promise to pay for the delivery of the electrical goods, made between October and December, 1978, upon a construction site known as "Johnny Rider's
Backstage Restaurant" in Provo, Utah.
The record amply shows that there was not a written or
oral agreement between the parties for the payment of goods delivered by plaintiff.

Plaintiff, at the trial has attempted

through circumstantial evidence to show that there was an implied
agreement, in the form of an original promise to pay, by virtue
of the two Exhibits admitted into Court.

An examination however

of the Exhibits and the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, show
that plaintiff failed in its burden of proof to prove that an
original undertaking on the part of the defendant existed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The only witness that could possibly connect the defendant with the plaintiff and the subsequent delivery of goods
by plaintiff to the restaurant is a person by the name of Donald
R. Sturgill.

A review of Mr. Sturgill's testimony shows that,

during October, 1978, he was employed by the defendant as a car
salesman reporting directly to the sales manager {Tr. p. 8, lines
5-6).

His prior employment had also consisted· of acting as an

outside salesman for the plaintiff

o

Upon learning that a Mr. Rider and Mike Evans were interested in remodeling their restaurant he volunteered to assist
them in obtaining " ..... a good price on what they needed" for
the.electrical supplies in such remodeling (Tr. p. 9, lines 14
17)G

Mr. Sturgill also informed the manager of the plaintiff at

the time that the materials sought :·.to be purchased from the plaintiff were to be used in connection with the restaurant.
lines 28 - 30, to po 10, line l)e

{Tr. p. 9,

Specifically, in answer to plain-

tiff's question Mro Sturgill stated that he did not instruct City
Electric to charge merchandise to the plaintiff's account but
stated:

"By no means did I instruct.

I requested and asked whether

they [Johny Rider and Mike Evans] could establish an account "Tr.
p. 10, lines 5 - 6).
Viewing Mr. Sturgill's testimony consisting of three
and a half pages in the record {Tr. p. 7 line 1 top. 10, line 12)
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in the light most favorable to plaintiff, no evidence whatsoever
was produced that can even be remotely construed as a promise by
defendant to pay for the materials which plaintiff delivered to
the restaurant site.
As a matter of fact the only inference that can be made
from Mr. Sturgill's testimony is that Mr. Rider and Mr. Evans,
individually, in their efforts to remodel their restaurant, sought,
the help of Mr. Sturgill, as a former employee of the plaintiff,
to ascertain prices and open an account for their own credit with
the plaintiff (Tr. p. 9, lines 14 - 20).

Therefore, the credit

extended by plaintiff was given to the individuals and not the defendant.
It is plainly clear that there is no evidence in the
record whereby Finding of Fact No. 6 to wit,
"6.

Mike Evans instructed that the purchases were to

be charged to defendant's account with plaintiff"
can be sustained.
Only from the testimony of Mr. Sturgill could one possibly extract such an inference; however, upon reviewing the same
(Tr. p. 7 to p. 10) no such inference can be made.

The substance

of Mr. Sturgill's testimony is that he had a telephone conversation with plaintiff's agent inquiring as to prices.

When speci-

fically asked about whether or not he instructed anyone as to the
charging of merchandise to the defendant's account, he replied:

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By no means did I instruct.

I requested and asked

whether they could establish an account.
(Tr. p. 10, lines 5 - 6; emphasis added).
Since defendant had already an account open with plaintiff it
would not be necessary for Mr. Sturgill to ask on behalf of defendant.

It is obvious from the testimony as shown on page 9 of

the transcript that it was "

. Mike and Johnny were involved

in the restaurant and that they would be purchasing materials."
(Tro p. 9, lines 29 - 30, emphasis added), and not the defendant;
plaintiff was fully aware of that fact at the time it sold the
materials ..
It is respectfully submitted that in order to arrive at
the finding, as suggested by the trial court, that defendant became liable as a promissor, for an original promise to pay, plaintiff had to produce some modicum of evidence either express or
implied showing the intent of the defendant to be bound to pay
for the materials.

For instance plaintiff failed to prove that

the defendant corporation promised to pay after the materials were
delivered; or, that, the defendant corporation acting through any
of its authorized representations impliedly, promised to pay because it had any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the
transaction; or that there was a promise by defendant corporation
to pay; or, that the furnishing of the materials was for the benefit of the defendanto

-7-
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It is clear that plaintiff failed in its burden of
proof to show any remote connection between the corporate defendant and the furnishing of materials by plaintiff for the remodeling of a restaurant owned by Ride.r and Evans.
Part of Finding of Fact #14, to-wit:
14 .

These invoices [October 8, 1978 and October

9, 1978] were paid in December by defendant.
cannot be sustained by the evidence.

There is no reference

whatsoever_ in the record that defendant corporation paid for the
items and invoices recited therein.

The only evidence in the re-

cord is that those two invoces were paid, however, no testimony
or other documentary evidence exists to show if the defendant
corporation paid the two invoices dated October 8 and October 9,
1978.

(Tr. p. 12, lines 28 - 30; p. 13, lines 1 - 24).

Plaintiff

is merely bootstrapping his case on the theory that if payment
was made, i t was made by the defendant; however the inference
should be made that Johnny Rider and/or Mike Evans paid for the
items charged on those dates, and in view of Mr. Sturgill's testimony relating who wanted the construction done (Tr. p. 8, lines
19 - 30; p. 9, lines 12 - 20); • • . it is the only permissible
inference.
The trial court erred in its finding that it was the
intent of the parties that the corporate defendant would pay for
the materials delivered by plaintiff on the construction site.
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The circumstances and facts of the case as presented by plaintiff fail to show the intent of the defendant to pay for materials ordered by third parties ..

The record is devoid of any evi-

dence, express or implied, where an inference can be made that
the credit by plaintiff was extended to defendant.

There were

no words, oral or written, used by defendant in making a "promise"
to pay for the materials delivered by defendant.

There is no

evidence that the plaintiff was induced by defendant to deliver
the materials to the construction site, nor that the goods were
furnished by defendant relying upon the credit or the request of
the defendant.
In Sugar v. Miller, 6 U 2d 433, 315 P 2d 862 (1957)
this Court found that there was an original promise to pay for
the delivery of services by the defendant, by examining the circumstances and the intent of the parties, in determining liability..

In the Sugar case, there were express representations and

inducements and furthermore, the defendant in that case was extending the credit only upon those representationso
In the instant case a review of the records clearly
shows an absence of any evidence, from which an inference can
be made as to the liability of the defendanto
The best that can be said for plaintiff's case is
that, defendant had an open account with the plaintiff, and
that defendant delivered materials valued at $2,332e76 upon a
remodeling site known as "Johnny Rider's Backstage Restaurant",
and that there was no record of a written objection by the corSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
porate
defendant
regarding the invoices sued upon, and that the
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prices charged on the invoices were "fair" or that the purchaser
was treated fairly.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff was actually relying upon the credit of Mr. Sturgill rather than the
corporate defendant because Mr. Hatch, plaintiff's store manager, in answer to plaintiff's counsel's questions stated:
Q.

And so, in other words, you were giving a more

favorable price to this account that you otherwise
would to this type of customer?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Why did you do that?

A.

Well, I knew Dave Sturgill, and he had been a friend

of mine, and he asked me to do him a favor.
(Tr. P. 34, lines 3 - 9).
It is also clear that plaintiff knew at the time that
Mr. Sturgill was not an authorized representative or agent of
the defendant.

Mr. Hatch testified as follows:

Q.

Mr. Hatch, you said Mr. Sturgill was a friend of yours?

A.

Yes, an acquaintance, a friend, yes.

Q.

You knew he was working for Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth,

Inc.?
A.

I knew he was, did you say?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, I knew he was.
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Q.

Did you know what capacity he was working in?

A.

He was a car salesman.

Q.

You knew that he did not have any managerial capacity

in that dealership, did you not?
Ae

I did not know that, but I assumed he did not.

Q.

All righto

During this period of time that you and

he had a conversation, you assumed that he did not have
any managerial capacity?
A.

True.

Q.

Is that correct?

A..

Yes.

(Tr. p. 36, lines 1 - 19).
Mr. Hatch's further testimony showed clearly and unequivocally that plaintiff knew at the time of the ordering of the materials for whom the materials were
Q.

intended~

You were aware of the delivery of the remodeling

project of the Backstage Restaurant?
A.,

I was.

Q.

Mro Sturgill told you that?

A.

Yes.

(Tre P. 37, line 25 - 29).
In conclusion in reviewing the record of the testimony
of the witnesses and the documentary evidence there is not a
preponderance of evidence supporting the finding of liability by
the Court against the corporate defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff's claims
against the corporate defendant are barred by the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds, §25-5-4(2), wherein it is stated that:
In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:

(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another.
A review of the record clearly indicates that it was
not the intent of the parties that the defendant should be liable
for charges made to its account with the plaintiff by third parties.
Plaintiff has failed in its burden of proof in showing by preponderance of evidence, that the requisite elements of intent existed
in order to charge the defendant with liability.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO APPARENT AUTHORITY
FOR DEFENDANT'S ACCOUNT TO BE
USED BY THIRD PARTIES, NOR RATIFICATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
CHARGES MADE THEREIN.
The fundamental rule relating to apparent or ostensible
authority of an officer of a corporation is that the corporation
is bound by the acts of an officer if he acts in the usual course
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the business of the corporation in such a way as to justify to
third persons who deal with him in inferring or assuming that he
is doing an act or making a contract within the scope of his authority.

However, apparent or ostensible authority is .

"limited and governed by the character of business in which the
corporation is engaged"o

19 Am Jur 2d, §1164, p. 591.

The facts of the instant case clearly disclose that
at the time plaintiff sold and delivered the electrical supplies
and materials to the restaurant construction site, plaintiff knew
that defendant corporation was engaged in the business of selling
automobiles.

Plaintiff knew that the materials were to be used

for the remodeling of a restaurant (Tr. p. 37, lines 25 - 30),
and there is no evidence in the record that there was any connection between the restaurant remodeling and the corporate defendant.

As a matter of fact, the contrary clearly appears in the

record from the evidence of plaintiff's first witness (Mr. Sturgill) when in response to plaintiff's counsel's questions he replied that Johnny Rider and Mike Evans were remodeling "their"
restaurant and needed electrical supplies and furthermore, he,
Mr. Sturgill, specifically related to Don Hatch the following:
A.

I had talked to Don and told him who the restaurant

was for, yes.

I told him that Mike and Johny were involved

in the restaurant and that they would be purchasing rnaterialse
(Tr. P. 9, lines 28 - 30, p. 10, line 1).
~12-
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For defendant to assert at the time of the trial (Tr.
p. 51, lines 12 - 25) that it relied

upon~the

corporate defendant

to get paid is an argument contrary to the plaintiff's own elicitation of the facts.
It is clear that the trial court totally misinterpreted
the law of apparent or ostensible authority in analyzing the facts
before it and those findings of fact are not supported by any
evidence whatsoever in the record.

Plaintiff simply knew from

the beginning, around October 1978, who was going to get the materials and who was going to pay for them.

The only witness upon

which plaintiff relies to make its case of apparent or ostensible
authority (Mr. Surgill), clearly and unequivocally told plaintiff's
manager, Mr. Hatch, who was ordering and who was going to use the
materials.

From the testimony of the record no other inference

can be made as no shred of evidence, let alone a preponderance of
evidence, exists to make the defendant corporation liable for
the debts of a third party.
Mr. Batch's testimony certainly did not produce any
evidence showing that the plaintiff had any express or implied
authorization by the defendant to charge defendant's account with
the purchases.

Mr. Batch's testimony on that point, is that he

looked up the " • . • computer print-out for addresses and open
accounts

..

." ,

found one for the corporate defendant, and he,

himself, unilaterally, decided to charge defendant's account.
(Tr. p. 38, lines 23 - 30).
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The record cannot sustain Finding No. 13 to-wit,
13 Plaintiff relied upoii defendant's credit with
plaintiff in selling material and granting the
more favorable price.
in that neither Mr. Middlestead, nor Mr. Hatch, plaintiff's
agent ever asserted or implied that they relied upon the credit
of the defendant in selling the materials.

Any such inference

by the Court is reversible error.
The case for the "reliance upon the credit of defendant"
and upon the "apparent authority" theories of plaintiff's case is
attempted to be reached through a circuitous route commencing with
a telephone conversation which plaintiff's agent Don Hatch had
with a former employee of plaintiff (Sturgill), who at the time
was a salesman for defendant, who (Sturgill) had a conversation
with Mike Evans, who told him that they (Rider and Evans) wanted
to obtain fair prices for electrical materialse

As a matter of

fact, defendant's counsel's motion to strike the conversation
between Mr. Hatch and

Mr~

Sturgill, having been made and renewed,

was overruled by the court.

(Tr. pe 29, lines 23 - 30; Tr. p. 30,

lines 13 - 22; Tro p. 36, lines 20 - 23; Tr. p. 37 lines 1 - 7).
It is respectfully submitted that any evidence of the telephone
conversation between Mr. Sturgill and Mre Hatch should have been
excluded, and the failure of the trial to do so, is reversible
error; in any event it certainly does not factually support the
findings made by the trial Court.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant submits that the lower Court erred in all
material respects in finding for the plaintiff an assessing
liability against the defendant, and that this Court should
enter its order reversing the judgment of the trial Court and
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
Re~ec:fully

submitted,

u~
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